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A Side-Constrained Peer-to-Peer Carpooling Stochastic User Equilibrium Model 
 
Ruimin MA, Lifei YAO 
 
Abstract: Peer-to-peer (P2P) carpooling has become an effective way to utilize the idle car capacity and ease traffic congestion. However, the interactive relationship 
between carpooling and traffic congestion has not been fully quantified. To make up for this gap, this paper constructs a side-constrained P2P carpooling stochastic user 
equilibrium model to disclose the effects of carpooling on traffic congestion. Next, the proposed model was transformed into a linear constrained minimization problem, and 
the problem was proved to have a unique solution. The case study shows that the travellers prefer carpooling at a high fuel price and a low inconvenient cost. 
 





The population boom, coupled with urban sprawl, has 
intensified the traffic congestion in big cities across the 
globe. In its 2012 Urban Mobility Report, the Texas A & 
M Transportation Institute pointed out that each American 
commuter faced a delay of 38 h and a congestion cost of 
820 $ in 2012, putting the total congestion cost in the US 
at 120 billion USD [1]. In 2015, the congestion cost in 
Beijing, China amounted to 115 USD/month, i.e. RMB 
1385 USD/year, per commuter. Against this backdrop, 
governments around the world have been paying efforts to 
ease traffic congestion, but the effect is poor due to the 
growing number and low occupancy of private cars. In 
Europe, the car occupancy is only 1,13 people per car on 
the way to work or other places (EEA, 2010, European 
Environment Agency. Occupancy rates of passenger 
vehicles. Technical report. Retrieved from European 
Environment Agency). In the US, the private cars are less 
occupied, as only 10% Americans choose carpooling to 
work (US-DOT, 2011, U.S. DOT / Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA). Our Nation's Highways). If the 
unoccupied transport ability of private cars could be 
utilized, the traffic congestion would be effectively 
alleviated. This provides a good opportunity to peer-to-
peer (P2P) carpooling: the sharing of car journeys so that 
more than one person travels in a car, and prevents the need 
for others to have to drive to a location themselves. In fact, 
P2P carpooling has become increasingly popular thanks to 
the proliferation of sharing economy and the maturation of 
positioning, mobile network and payment technologies.  
The existing studies have shown that P2P carpooling 
can enhance the occupancy of private cars, and reduce total 
mileage, environmental pollution and exhaust emissions. 
However, most of them have only statistically quantified 
how much P2P carpooling eases traffic congestion, failing 
to identify the relationship between the two factors. 
Understanding this relationship is critical to the evaluation 
of carpooling providers, and the formulation of proper 
management and incentive measures. Under the 
background of sharing economy, this paper attempts to 





2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Ridesharing has long been a research hotspot in the 
transport field, previous studies have discussed the 
ridematching algorithms for ridesharing systems [2-3], 
dynamic ridesharing pricing [4-5], labour supply [6], trust 
among peers [7-8], socio-economic impacts of ridesharing 
services [9], environmental effects of ridesharing [10-11] 
Some scholars began to pay close attention to the 
impact of ridesharing on traffic congestion. There are 
different voices on distinguishing an impact of ridesharing 
on traffic. Boosters claim that the service might help to 
mitigate traffic congestion by providing travellers with a 
more efficient transportation mode and by reducing car use 
as well as car ownership. Based on mobile data, Alexander 
and González [12] discovered that ridesharing can 
significantly shorten the duration of traffic congestion 
under a high matching rate. Rayle et. al [13] argued that 
ridesharing only supplements public transport, though 
being an alternative to long-distance transport. Li et. al 
suggested that Uber eased the traffic congestion in 
American cities by reducing the idle rate of parking lots 
and curbing the growth in car ownership [14-15]. 
Opponents on the other hand criticize that the service 
would worsen current traffic, introduce more vehicular 
trips, compete public transits, mislead consumers with 
varying price system and cater to only specific groups of 
people who are well-educated and young. Erhardt et al. [16] 
examined whether transportation network companies (such 
as Uber and Lyft) live up to their stated vision of reducing 
congestion in major cities, and found that transportation 
network companies are the biggest contributor to growing 
traffic congestion in San Francisco. Most of the above 
studies are statistical analysis on how ridesharing affects 
traffic congestion, failing to reveal the exact influence 
mechanism and the quantitative relation between 
ridesharing and traffic. The P2P ridesharing considered in 
this paper is different from the traditional ridesharing (such 
as Uber), which allows private drivers to share the spare 
seats with other travellers for cost-saving purposes, who 
fundamentally differ from Taxi drivers who cruise around 
on the road for profit purposes. 
Few studies have quantified the interactive 
relationship between P2P carpooling and traffic 
congestion. Focusing on autostrada with or without high-
occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, Yang and Huang [17] 
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probed into the relationship between P2P carpooling and 
the optimal congestion price, and compared the optimal 
and second-best pricing models; however, their research 
only applies to the case of single origin and single 
destination (SOSD) and allows each driver to take only one 
rider. Qian and Zhang [18] investigated the relationship 
between P2P carpooling and traffic congestion of multiple 
transport modes, namely, public transport, private car and 
carpooling, but their research is also limited to the SOSD 
transport network. Xu et al. [19] put forward a new traffic 
assignment model to find the relationship between P2P 
carpooling factors (e.g. price, the number of drivers and the 
number of riders) and traffic congestion in the case of 
multiple origins and multiple destinations (MOMD), 
assuming that the drivers and riders are assumed to have 
the same origin-destination (OD) pairs. In actual P2P 
carpooling, the drivers often take detours to pick up or drop 
off riders, indicating that the drivers and riders often have 
inconsistent OD pairs. In view of this shortage, Xu et al. 
[20] set up a traffic equilibrium model based on P2P 
carpooling, transformed the model into a hybrid 
complementary model, and applied the hybrid model to 
several cases with different network structures. The case 
study shows that more travellers prefer to act as carpooling 
drivers at a high price of P2P carpooling. Nevertheless, the 
research of Xu et al. faces two problems: (1) the travel cost, 
an estimated value for carpooling participants, was taken 
as an exact value; (2) the link capacity was not considered 
and thus sometimes surpassed by the link flow. 
 
3 MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
 
In order to analyse the problem of P2P carpooling 
stochastic user equilibrium with sided-constrained, this 
paper makes the following assumptions: each traveller can 
act as a solo driver, a carpooling driver or a carpooling 
rider; the same traveller needs to pay different costs of the 
same arc on an OD pair for different transport modes; the 
rider alone cannot select between travel modes, but being 
supported by a carpooling driver. 
 
3.1 Network Description 
 
According to above assumptions, the author set up a 
super-network to distinguish between the travel modes, 
which can be regarded as the combination of the rider's 
network and the driver's network. The super-network is 
presented in Fig. 1, where V' is the set of riders' origins and 
destinations and A' is the set of origins and destinations 
shared by riders and drivers. 
 
Figure 1 Super-network 
 
In Fig. 1, RD, SD and P are respectively the 
abbreviation of carpooling driver, solo driver and 
passenger. For simplicity, it is also assumed that the role 
(i.e. driver or rider) of a traveller remains unchanged 
through the journey from the origin to the destination, and 
that each rider can only be served by one driver, i.e. the 
riders are reluctant to change cars. Under this assumption, 
any arc in the super-network is either driver or rider. As 
shown in Fig. 1, there are three types of arcs in the super-
network, respectively denoted as A1, A2 and A3. Under A1, 
a solo driver continues to drive alone after passing through 
node i; Under A2, a solo driver changes into a carpooling 
driver (i.e. picks up a rider) after passing through node i; 
Under A3, a carpooling driver changes into a solo driver 
(i.e. drops off a rider). 
 
Table 1 Details on the super-network 
( )0 0 0, G V A=  Basic network, where V0 is the set of nodes and A0 is the set of arcs 
( ), G V A=  Super-network, where 0 0
'V V V= ∪  is the set of nodes 
and A  is the set of arcs 
0, O D V⊆  
The set of origins and the set of destinations in the 
basic network 
, O D V⊆  
The set of origins and the set of destinations in the 
super-network, 0
'O O O= ∪  and D D D'= ∪  
A1, A2, A3 
The set of the arcs of solo drivers, the set of the arcs of 
carpooling drivers, the set of arcs of riders; 
1 2 3A A A A= ∪ ∪  
a1, a2, a3 The arcs in A1, A2 and A3, , 1, 2, 3j ja A j∈ =  
K DO⊆ ×  ( ) ( ){ }, , , , , k k k k k kK o d o d o O d ' O'D' ' o= ∈∈ ∈
is the set of OD pairs 
Rk 
The set of paths between OD pair k, i.e. the set of all 
paths from ok. to dk or from o'k to d'k, kr R∈  is one of 
the paths 
 
Let G0 = (V0, A0) and G = (V, A) be the basic network 
and the super-network, respectively. As shown in Fig. 1, V 
is the set of nodes, A is the set of arcs, A1 is the set of the 
arcs of solo drivers (i.e. (o, i), (i, j) and (j, d)), A2 is the set 
of arcs of carpooling drivers ((o, i), (i, j) and (j, d)), A3 is 
the set of arcs of riders (i.e.(o, i), (i, j) and (j, d)). The details 
on the super-network are listed in Tab. 1. 
 
Table 2 Parameters and variable 
Parameters 
qk Demand of OD pair , k k K∈  
uk Minimum expected travel cost of OD pair k  
C Maximum capacity of each driver 
ta Minimum time for a A∈  
la Length for a A∈  
ca Traffic capacity for a A∈  
xa Flow for a A∈ between OD pair k K∈   
k
ac  Travel cost for a A∈ between OD pair k K∈  
ya Flow for a A∈  
r
kh  Flow of path r between OD pair , kk r R∈  
r
kc  
General travel cost of path kr R∈ between OD 
pair k  
fa Cost for a A∈  
y  Vector with components ya for a A∈  
tta(y) Driver's travel time cost for 1 2a A A∈ ∪  
tt'a(y) Rider's travel time cost for 𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝐴3 
Variable  δar 
If δar = 1, then arc a lies on r; if δar = 0, then arc a 
does not lie on r 
 
Since 1 2 0 0, A VA V⊂ ×  and 3 0 0
' 'A V V×⊂ , any feasible 
path through the nodes in V0 𝑉𝑉0  can and only can go 
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through the arcs in 1 2A A∪  Similarly, any feasible path 
through the nodes in 0
'V  can and only can go through the 
arcs in A3. Hence, no feasible path can go through the arcs 
in A3 and 1 2A A∪  at the same time. Tab. 2 lists the 
parameters and variable in this research. 
 
3.2 Cost Function 
 
The travel cost of a driver consists of three parts: travel 
time cost, fuel cost and inconvenient cost. On this basis, 
the cost function of carpooling can be expressed as follows. 
 
3.2.1 Congestion Cost of Drivers 
 
According to the classic Bureau of Public Roads 
(BPR) arc cost function [21], the congestion cost of drivers 










tt y t a A A
c
 +  = + ∈ ∪     
                      (1) 
 
where, α and β are positive constants. 
 
3.2.2 Fuel Cost of Drivers 
 
The fuel cost takes up a huge part in the travel cost. It 
can be obtained by multiplying the arc length and the fuel 
price per unit length: 
 
0, a aM l a Aτ ρ= ⋅ ⋅ ∈                                                          (2) 
 
where, ρ is the fuel price per unit length; τ is the 
dimensional transformation parameter between cost and 
time. Both parameters are positive constants. 
 
3.2.3 Congestion Cost of Riders 
 









tt y t a A
c
 + +  ′ = + ∈     
                    (3) 
 
where, the values of α and β are the same as those in Eq. 
(1), assuming that the drivers and riders in P2P carpooling 
can tolerate the same length of congestion time. 
 
3.2.4 Payment of Riders 
 
The drivers joining the carpooling system aim to 
reduce the travel cost by charging fees to riders. Here, it is 
assumed that the drivers and riders go Dutch on the fuel 
cost of the shared arcs. The payment of carpooling riders 
can be calculated as: 
 
3
1( ) , 
1
p
a aB y M a Aγ
= ∈
+
                                                 (4) 
 
where, the superscript p denotes rider. 
 
3.2.5 Income of Drivers 
 
The driver's income equals the sum of the payments of 
all riders in his / her vehicle. Considering the match 
between drivers and riders, the number of riders per vehicle 
should be limited between 1 and the maximum capacity C 




1( ) , 
1
d
a aB y M a Aγ γ
= ⋅ ∈
+
                                                 (5) 
 
where, the superscript d denotes driver; ( )1, Cγ ∈  is the 
number of riders per vehicle. 
 
3.2.6 Inconvenient Cost of Drivers 
 
The inconvenient cost of drivers includes the extra 
travel time cost, the waiting time cost for picking up riders, 
and the cost to serve the riders. Thus, this cost can be 
formulated as: 
 
22 3( ) , 
d d d
a a a a aI y y y a Aµ π= + ∈                                           (6) 
 
3.2.7 Inconvenient Cost of Riders 
 
Carpooling brings some inconveniences to the riders, 
such as the cost to travel from the origin to the pick-up 
point, the cost to wait for the driver, and the cost of detour 
to pick up or drop off other riders. Thus, this cost can be 
formulated as: 
 
32 3( ) , 
p p p
a a a a aI y y y a Aµ π= + ∈                                         (7) 
 
To sum up, the total travel cost of any traveller on arc 





( ) ( ), 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 
( ) ( ) ( ), 
a a
d d
a a a a a
p p
a a a
tt y M y a A
f y tt y M y B y I y a A
tt y B y I y a A
+ ∈
= + − + ∈

′ + + ∈
                     (8) 
 
For any OD pairs, the cost ( )af y  on the arc a remains 
the same. If all the total travel costs on the arcs are 
independent, then the total path cost in the network can be 
obtained by adding up the cost of each arc: 
 
( ) ( )r kk ar a
a A
c h f yδ
∈
= ∑                                                                (9) 
 
where, ( )rkc h  is the total cost of path p; karδ  is the 
relationship between arc a and path r ( If 1arδ = , then arc 
a lies on r; if 0arδ = , then arc a does not lie on r.); h  is 
the path flow corresponding to the arc flow y. 
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3.3 Side-Constrained P2P Carpooling Stochastic User 
Equilibrium Model 
 
To solve the inaccurate, random estimation of path 
cost of carpooling participants, this paper describes the 
path selection of these participants with the stochastic 
equilibrium model. Specifically, the Wardrop's user 
equilibrium principle was introduced into the P2P 
carpooling travel distribution, creating a side-constrained 
P2P carpooling stochastic user equilibrium model (SC-
P2P-CSUE model): 




y x a A
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                                         (10) 
 
a ay c≤                                                                            (11) 
 
0, , kax a A k K≥ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                                                  (12) 
 
Path flow constraints: 
 
,k ra ar k
k K
x h r Rδ
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                                         (13) 
 
0rkh ≥                                                                                   (14) 
 




h q k K
∈
= ∈∑                                                                     (15) 
 
, r rk k kh P q k K= ∈                                                                          (16) 
 
where, 1 2 3a a a ay y y yγ= + + , with ( )1, 4γ ∈  being the 
number of riders picked up or dropped off by a driver. 
Eq. (11) shows the difference between our model and 
the traditional stochastic user equilibrium model. This 
equation was called by Patriksson and Larsson as the side-
constrained model and extended into the total Wardrop's 
equilibrium model named side-constrained traffic 
assignment model [22-23]. Nonetheless, the extended 
model only considers side-constrained determined user 
equilibrium and does not apply to side-constrained 
stochastic user equilibrium [24]. 
 
3.4 Linear Constraint Minimization for SC-P2P-CSUE Model 
 
In SC-P2P-CSUE model, every arc a A∈  has a fixed 
capacity ca. Let λ be the multiplier of Eq. (11). Then, the 
total arc cost can be derived by the method of [22]: 
 
ˆ ( ) ( )a a a a af y f y λ= +                                                          (17) 
 
where, λa is the waiting cost for a A∈ . Here, λa must satisfy 












= <   ∈ ≥ =  
                                              (18) 
 
Thus, the travel path cost of a traveller encompasses 
two parts, namely, normal travel cost and waiting cost: 
 
( )( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )r k r rk ar a a a k k
a A
cˆ h f y c h hλ δ λ η
∈








= ∑                                                             (20) 
 
Then, the conditions of our model can be summed up 
as: For any OD pair k K∈ , the path flow rkh  equals the 
path flow of our model if and only if there exists a series of 
multipliers { }, a a Aλ ∈  that satisfy: 
 
( )( ) ( )
, 
, 
( ) 0, 
0, 
r r r r




k K r Rk
a a a
a
h q P c h h
y c a A
y h a A








 ≤ ∀ ∈
 = ∀ ∈

 − = ∀ ∈
 ≥ ∈
∑ ∑                                             (21) 
 
The SC-P2P-CSUE model can be solved through 
linear constraint minimization [24]. In light of this, the 
linear constraint minimization of our model can be 
expressed as: 
 
min ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) rk k k k k k k k
k K k K r Rk
z h q S c h d h d h h
∈ ∈ ∈




a ay c≤                                                                          (23) 
 
, ra ar k
k K r Rk
y h a Aδ
∈ ∈
= ∀ ∈∑ ∑                                          (24) 
 




h q k K
∈
= ∈∑                                                       (26) 
 
where, Sk is the satisfaction function of the path selection 
between OD pair k. Let ck(h) be the cost when the path flow 
between OD pair k is h . Then, (i) S(ck(h)) relative to ck(h) 
is concave; (ii) the partial derivative of S(ck(h)) relative to 












                                              (27) 
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4 EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE SOLUTION TO 
SC-P2P-CSUE MODEL 
 
Theorem 1 (Existence) Any local minimum h* of 
linear constraint minimization Eq. (22) - Eq. (26) satisfies 
the conditions of our model, and the optimal Lagrange 
multiplier for the arc capacity constraint equals the arc 
delayed cost in SC-P2P-CSUE model. 
Proof: The Lagrange function of Eq. (22) - Eq. (26) 
can be constructed as: 
 
( , , ) ( ( ) ( ))
( ) ( )
k k k k
k K
r r r
k k k a a a k k k
k K r R a A k K r Rk k
L h q S c h d h




∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= + −
 




∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑

     (28) 
 
where, λa and πk are the Lagrange multipliers of Eq. (23) 
and Eq. (26) respectively; ( )k kd h  is only a function of the 
flow between OD pair k. Taking the partial derivatives of 
(  is one path between OD pair )li ih l R i∈ For Eq. (28) and 
substituting Eq. (27) and Eq. (20) into the partial derivative 
formula, we have: 
 
( , , )
( )
r r
r rk i i
k k i il l l
k K r R r Ri i ik i
r
l r ki i
i i i ar a il
r R a Aii
c ( h ) d ( h )L h q P q P
h h h







      ∂ ∂∂
 = −          ∂ ∂ ∂     
  ∂
− × − −    ∂  
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
   (29) 
 
where, rkP  and 
r
iP  are short for the path selection 
probabilities ( ( ) ( ))r k kk kP c h d h+  and ( ( ) ( ))
r
i ii iP c h d h+ , 







r r k ik a a
k k k k ar all




c ( h ) f y
q P q P
yh





∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
∈
    ∂




∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
  (30) 
 
Thus, the Lagrange partial derivatives in Eq. (29) can 
be rewritten as: 
 
d ( )( , , ) ( )
d
i l ia a
a al i i al a il
aa A a Ai
f yL h y d h
yh
λ π
δ δ λ π
∈ ∈
 ∂
= + + − 
∂  
∑ ∑  (31) 
 
Let h* be a local minimum. According to the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, there exist Lagrange 
multipliers λ* and π* that satisfy: 
 
( , , ) 0, , il
i
L h l R i K
h
λ π∗ ∗ ∗∂
= ∈ ∈
∂
                                 (32) 
 
a ay c
∗ ≤                                                                          (33) 
 
( ) 0a a ay cλ
∗ ∗ − =                                                              (34) 
 
0aλ
∗ ≥                                                                            (35) 
In addition, the optimal arc flow can be derived from 
the path flow h* as: 
 
, r ka k ar
k K r Rk
y h a Aδ∗ ∗
∈ ∈
= ∈∑ ∑                                            (36) 
 
The following can be deduced from Eq. (25): 
 
( )l i ia ai i a a a al al a i
aa A a A
df ( y )
d h y | y y
dy
δ δ λ π∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∈ ∈
 
= = + − 
 
∑ ∑  (37) 
 
( )( )l l li i i i i i if q P c h eη π∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= + −                                    (38) 
 
where, ei = (1, …, 1); (... , , ...); l l l ii i i al a
a A
η η η δ λ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∈
= = ∑ . 
Obviously, the left side of Eq. (38) is the path cost 
under the path flow of h*. According to the path selection 
probability, Eq. (38) can be transformed into: 
 
( )( ) ( )l li i i i if q P c h d h∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= +                                          (39) 
 
Clearly, Eq. (39) is the conditions of our model. In 
other words, Eq. (33) - Eq. (35) and Eq. (38) satisfy the 
conditions of our model and aλ
∗ is the arc delayed cost. 
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness) The linear constraint 
minimization of our model outputs a unique solution 
Proof: Let y = (..., ya, …) be a row vector with all arc 
flows, fa(ya) = (…, fa(ya), …)  be the arc travel cost, 
( )kk ar RN k∆ δ ×=  be the relationship between path and arc,  
N be the number of arc, and Rk  be the number of paths in 
OD pair k. Then, the relationship between path and arc can 




y f ∆=∑                                                             (40) 
 
Considering the additivity of arc cost, the conditions 
of our model can be expressed as: 
 
( )( )aa k k
k K
y q P f y λ
∈
= +∑                                              (41) 
 
a ay c≤                                                                          (42) 
 
( ) 0a a ay cλ − =                                                              (43) 
 
0aλ ≥                                                                           (44) 
 
where, ( )( ) ( )akP f y η λ±−  is the probability of all paths 
passing through arc a in OD pair k: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ( ))a k rk ar k k k
k K r Rk
P f y P c f yλ δ η
∈ ∈
+ = +∑ ∑             (45) 
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Let Pk(ck+ƞk) and Pk(f(y)+λ) be the row vectors of the 
probabilities to select all the paths and all the arcs 
associated with OD pair k, respectively. Then, the two row 
vectors can be described as: 
 
( ) (..., ( ( ( )) ), ...)rk k k k k kc P c f yη η+ = +P                          (46) 
( ( ) ) (..., ( ( ) ), ...)k kf y P f yλ λ+ = +P                                  (47) 
 
According to Eq. (45), the relationship between arc 
and path selection probabilities can be depicted as: 
 
T( ( ) ) ( ( ( )) )k k k k kf y P c f yλ η ∆+ = +P                                  (48) 
 
Then, we have: 
 
( )( )a k k
k K
y q P f y λ
∈
= +∑                                                        (49) 
 
Next, Theorem 2 is proved by the reduction to 
absurdity. 
Suppose the linearly constrained minimization Eq. 
(22) - Eq. (26) can generate two local minimums, namely, 
1 1(..., , ...)kf f=  and 
2 2(..., , ...)kf f= , with the relevant 
optimal Lagrange multipliers λ1 and λ2. Let vectors 
1 1(..., , ...)ay y=  and
2 2(..., , ...)ay y=  be the path flows of 
our model. The two path flows, coupled with the optimal 
Lagrange multipliers, satisfy the conditions of our model: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )( )1 2 1 1 2 2k k k
k K
y y q P f y P f yλ λ
∈
− = + − +∑     (50) 
 
Multiplying both sides of Eq. (50) by a column vector 
( ) ( )( )T1 2 1 2f y f y λ λ− + − , we have: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
T1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2
T1 2 1 2
k k k
k K
y y f y f y
q P f y P f y





− − + − =
= + − + ×
× − + −
∑               (51) 
 
The first step is to prove that the above equation has a 
non-positive RHS. For this purpose, a real continuously 
differentiable function 1 1( )φ ς = ℜ →ℜ  can be defined as: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 1 2 2
T1 2 1 2
( ) k k k
k K
q P f y P f y
f y f y
φ ς λ λ
λ λ
∈
= + − + ×




It is easy to get that: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )( )




1 2 (1) (0)
k k k
k K
q P f y P f y
f y f y
λ λ
λ λ φ φ
∈
+ − + ×
× − + − = −
∑
 
According to the mean value theorem, there is a 
(1, 0)ς ∗ ∈  such that: 
 
(1) (0) ( )(1 0)φ φ φ ς ∗′− = −                                                 (52) 
 
The derivative of function ( ) at φ ς ς ς ∗=  can be 
expressed as: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 2 2
T1 2 1 2
( ) k k k
k K
k
q P f y P f y
ˆ ˆP f f y f y




′ = + − + ×




where, ( )k ˆ ˆP f λ∇ +  is the Jacobian matrix of the arc 
selection probabilities, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 21fˆ f y f yς ς∗ ∗= + −                                              (54) 
 
( )1 21λˆ ς λ ς λ∗ ∗= + −                                                      (55) 
 
Eq. (48) implies that 
 
( ) ( ) Tk k k k k kˆ ˆ ˆˆP f P cλ ∆ η ∆∇ + = ×∇ + ×                               (56) 
 
where, ( )k k kˆˆP c η∇ +  is the Jacobian matrix of the path 
selection probabilities ( )( )k f y λ+P . The total path travel 
cost k kˆcˆ η+  can be defined as: 
 
ˆˆk kc f= ∆                                                                          (57) 
 
k
ˆηˆ λ∆=                                                                            (58) 
 
Substituting Eq. (56) into Eq. (53), we have: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )(
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 2 1 2




k k k k
q f y f y
ˆˆP c f y f y




′ = − + − ×
×∇ + ∇ − + −
∑
          (59) 
 
Sheffi [25] pointed out that the Jacobian matrix 
( )k k kˆˆP c η∇ + of the path selection probability is negative 
semidefinite. Thus, we have 
 
( ) 0φ ς ∗′ ≤                                                                          (60) 
 
In other words, the right side of Eq. (51) is non-
positive. The next step is to prove that left side of Eq. (51) 
is nonnegative. To this end, another real continuously 
differentiable function can be defined as: 
 
( )( )( )T2 1 2 1 2( ) f y y y y yϕ γ γ= + − −                            (61) 
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This function has the following features: 
(1) ( ) ( )( ) ( )T1 2 1 2 (1) (0)f y f y y y ϕ ϕ− − = − ; 
(2) There exists a (0, 1)γ ∗ ∈  satisfying 
( ) ( )( ) ( )T1 2 1 2 ( )(1 0)'f y f y y y ϕ γ ∗− − = − ; 
(3) ( ) ( )( )( )T1 2 2 1 2 1 2( ) y y f y y y y y'ϕ γ γ∗ ∗= − ∇ + − − , 
 
where, ( )( )2 1 2f y y yγ ∗∇ + −  is the Jacobian matrix of f(y)  when ( )2 1 2y y y yγ ∗= + − . 
Since ( )( )2 1 2f y y yγ ∗∇ + −  is a diagonal matrix of 
non-negative real numbers ( )( )2 1 2af y y yγ ∗+ − , we have: 
 
( ) 0ϕ γ ∗′ ≥                                                                        (62) 
 
Feature (2) implies that: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )T1 2 1 2 0f y f y y y− − ≥                                     (63) 
 
Further, we have: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
T1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 0
a a a a
a A
a a a a a a
a A
y y y y
c y c y




− − = − − =
= − + − ≥
∑
∑
           (64) 
 
Because 0aλ ≥  and 0a ac y− ≥ , it is easy to derive 
that ( )( )T1 2 1 2 0y y λ λ− − ≥ . 
Then, the left side of Eq. (51) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )T1 2 1 2 1 2y y f y f y λ λ− − + −  can be divided into 
two parts: ( ) ( )( ) ( )T1 2 1 2f y f y y y− −  and 
( )( )T1 2 1 2y y λ λ− − , as shown in Eq. (63) and Eq. (64). 
Since ( ) ( )( ) ( )T1 2 1 2 0f y f y y y− − ≥  and 
( )( )T1 2 1 2 0y y λ λ− − ≥ , we have 
( ) ( ) ( )( )T1 2 1 2 1 2 0y y f y f y λ λ− − + − ≥ . 
The above analysis shows that the left side of Eq. (51) 
is greater than or equal to 0, while the right side of Eq. (51) 
is smaller than or equal to 0, that is, both sides of the 
equation could be equal to 0: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )T1 2 1 2 0f y f y y y− − =                                         (65) 
 
Since the arc travel cost f(y) is a strictly monotone 
increasing function associated with y, we have y1 – y2 = 0. 
Therefore, we have. 
In conclusion, y1 = y2, that is, the linear constraint 
minimization of our model outputs a unique solution. 
 
5 COMPUTATION RESULTS 
 
In this section, we initially propose a solution to solve 
the linear constrained minimization problem of SC-P2P-
CSUE model. Then, we examine our proposed model on a 
four-node transportation network to demonstrate the 
solution optimality of our developed algorithm.  
 
5.1 Linear Constraint Minimization Solutions of SC-P2P-
CSUE Model 
 
The linear constraint minimization cannot be 
implemented directly due to the lack of specific expression 
of the path delay d(h) in the objective function Eq. (22). 







                                                                         (66) 
 
where, (..., , ...)aλ λ=  is a vector of the Lagrange 
multipliers associated with constraint Eq. (22). Then,  
 
( )( ) min ( ) a a ah a A





= + − 
 
∑                                 (67) 
 
where, Ω is the set of all feasible path flows without 
considering arc capacity ( )h hΩ =  satisfies Eq. (22) - Eq. 
(26). Eq. (66) shows that Lagrange duality is the optimal 
solution of linear constraint minimization associated with 
λ. Note that L(λ) is a concave function associated with non-
negative λ. 
Theorem 3 SC-P2P-CSUE model is a no constraint 
maximization problem. The objective function is a 
continuous differentiable concave function. If λ∗  is the 
optimal Lagrange duality, then ( )y λ∗  must be the arc 
flow of SC-P2P-CSUE model. 
Proof: For a given 0λ ≥ , suppose 
( ) ( )( )..., , ...ay yλ λ=  is a local minimum of linear 
constrained minimization. According to Theorem 2, 
Theorem 6.3.3 of Bazaraa et al. and Theorem 6.3.1 of 
Bazaraa et al., it is known that y(λ) is unique, and L(λ) is 
continuous differentiable and concave [20]. 
The KKT conditions of Lagrange duality are as 
follows: 
 





λ π∗ ∗ ∗∂
=
∂
                                                                 (68) 
( ), , 
0
k





                                                        (69) 
a ay c
∗ ≤                                                                               (70) 
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( ) 0a a ay cλ∗ ∗ − =                                                                (71) 
 
0aλ
∗ ≥                                                                                      (72) 
 
Similar to the proof process of Theorem 2, the KKT 
conditions must satisfy the conditions of SC-P2P-CSUE 
model.  
 
5.2 Case Study 
 
The target network has 4 nodes and 5 arcs. For 
simplicity, the author only tested the path flow of one OD 
pair (Fig. 2). The demand q of the OD pair (1, 4) was set to 
400. The details on ta, la, and ca are shown in Tab. 3. The 
BRP function was adopted to describe the congestion cost, 
with α = 0,15 and β = 2. 
 
Figure 2 The target network 
 
Table 3 Details of the target network 
Parameters No. of arc a 1 2 3 4 5 
ta 6 5 3 6 3 
la 4 3 1 4 1 
ca 300 200 250 350 400 
 
Moreover, the unit distance cost of drivers ρ was set to 
2 USD/km, the distance-time conversion factor ƞ was set 
to 1 USD/min, the value of γ was set to 4, and the 
inconvenient coefficients were set to 0 02d pa a ,µ µ= =   and 
0 0002d pa a ,π π= = , respectively. 
 
Table 4 Arc flows and costs in the network (ρ = 2) 
a  ya fa(y) λ a ya fa(y) λ 
a11 0 14 0 a33 160 4,81 0 
a12 40 8,82 0 a41 0 14 0 
a13 160 9,12 0 a42 0 14 0 
a21 0 11 0,85 a43 0 14 0 
a22 40 7,35 0,95 a51 0 5 0,73 
a23 160 8,07 0,47 a52 80 5,66 1,48 
a31 0 5 0 a53 320 6,11 0,36 
a32 40 4,52 0     
 
It can be seen from Tab. 4 that the divers and riders 
prefer carpooling in the network. More notably, the number 
of riders passing arc 2 reached the capacity constraint of 
that arc. According to the equilibrium conditions in Eq. 
(18), the value of λ must be greater than 0. In this case, the 
associated values of λ were λ22 = 0,95 and λ23 = 0,47, that 
is, the delayed congestion costs. Arc 5 also reached its 
capacity constraint, where the associated values of λ were 
λ52 = 1,48 and λ53 = 0,36. 
The path costs of the network under fixed parameter 
values are recorded in Tab. 5. 
Table 5 Path costs in the network 
Path 1 - 3 - 4 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 1 - 2 - 4 
Solo driver 17,58 24,73 28 
Carpooling driver 15,44 20,48 22,82 
Carpooling rider 15,01 20,4 23,12 
 
Tab. 5 shows that the travellers favoured the path '1-3-
4'. Using this path, the solo drivers had the highest travel 
cost (17,58). Thus, no driver would like to choose solo 
driving. Meanwhile, the travel cost of the riders was 
minimized under this path, and encouraged riders to choose 
carpooling. Due to the arc capacity constraint, a portion of 
travellers had to choose '1-2-3-4'. 
 
5.2.1 The Effect of Fuel Price 
 
Next, the unit distance cost of drivers ρ was adjusted 
to 0,5 USD/km, while the other parameter values were kept 
the same. In this case, obvious changes took place in the 
arc costs of the network. 
 
Table 6 Arc flows and costs in the network (ρ = 0,5) 
a  ya fa(y) λ a ya fa(y) λ 
a11 100 8,1 0 a33 80 3,95 0 
a12 20 7,16 0 a41 0 8 0 
a13 80 7,36 0 a42 0 8 0 
a21 102 6,78 0,45 a43 0 8 0 
a22 19,6 6,42 0,38 a51 202 3,57 0,33 
a23 78,4 6,61 0,42 a52 39,6 4,37 0,32 
a31 100 3,27 0 a53 158,4 4,66 0,25 
a32 20 3,77 0     
 
As shown in Tab. 6, the proportion of carpooling 
changed greatly as the unit distance cost of drivers dropped 
to 0,5 USD /km. Under ρ = 0,5, the lowest cost path in the 
network was still '1-3-4'. At this moment, the solo drivers 
had the lowest cost, such that many carpooling drivers 
turned to solo driving. This means the decline of fuel price 
encourages the travelers to drive alone, and the inverse is 
also true. The results show that fuel price adjustment can 
effectively stimulate the enthusiasm in carpooling and thus 
ease the traffic congestion. 
 
5.2.2 The Effect of Inconvenient Cost 
 
Keeping the other parameter values unchanged, the 
inconvenient coefficients were adjusted to 1d pa aµ µ= =  
and 1d pa aπ π= = , respectively. It is easy to learn that path 
'1-3-4' boasted the lowest cost. At this moment, the solo 
drivers had the lowest cost (11,2), such that all carpooling 
participants were willing to select solo-driving. In practice, 
the carpooling is made inconvenient by the following 
factors: the time and distance of detouring, the waiting 
time, the reduced comfort, and the commission of the 
carpooling platform. When these factors push up the cost 
to an excessively high level, the travellers will leave the 




In this paper, a super-network for P2P carpooling is 
constructed, involving the solo drivers, carpooling drivers 
and carpooling riders. Then, the cost functions were 
formulated for each of the three types of travellers. Based 
on the super-network, the authors established a side-
Ruimin MA, Lifei YAO: A Side-Constrained Peer-to-Peer Carpooling Stochastic User Equilibrium Model 
646                                                                                                                                                                                                          Technical Gazette 27, 2(2020), 638-647 
constrained P2P carpooling stochastic user equilibrium 
model and analyzed the details about the conditions of our 
model. Next, the linear constrain minimization of our 
model was proved to have a unique solution, laying the 
basis for P2P carpooling and traffic assignment. This 
research mainly focuses on model construction, failing to 
validate the model through in-depth case studies, and only 
considers two travel modes: solo driving and carpooling.  
We hope that after SC-P2P-CSUE model applied to 
public transportation, more private cars and drivers are 
introduced, which potentially benefits traffic. The future 
research will introduce more travel modes to the model, 
making it more realistic and accurate. Then, we also will 
try our best to gather more actual data and look for 
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